Clear arguments are provided for a variety of feminist positions, drawing upon up-to-date empirical research in this book. No background in feminism or philosophy is needed, and the clarity of the narrative ensures that 'Feminism: Issues and Arguments' will appeal to a wide audience. (source: Nielsen Book Data). The chapters are organised around key issues of practical significance. Clear arguments are provided for a variety of feminist positions, drawing upon up-to-date empirical research. No background in feminism or philosophy is needed, and the clarity of the narrative ensures that Feminism: Issues and Arguments will appeal to a wide audience.

In this paper, we argue that there are important differences between playing and non-playing roles in sport. The relevance of sex differences poses genuine philosophical and ethical difficulties for feminism in the context of playing sport. In the case of non-playing roles in general, and officiating in particular, we argue that reference to essential differences between men and women is irrelevant. Officiating elite men’s football is not a role for which ‘essential’ (psychological and biological) differences are causally implicated neither in competence nor excellence. Reference to such purported differences to justify the exclusion of women from roles such as officiating is unfounded and sexist.

En este artículo, defendemos que existen diferencias importantes entre las funciones del participante y del no participante en el deporte. La importancia de las diferencias de sexo presenta auténticas dificultades filosóficas y éticas para el feminismo dentro del contexto de la participación en el deporte. En el caso de las funciones no participantes en general, y del arbitraje en particular, defendemos que es irrelevante referirse a diferencias esenciales entre hombre y mujeres. Arbitrar fútbol masculino de élite no es una función en que diferencias “esenciales” (psicológicas o biológicas) estén causalmente relacionadas ni con la habilidad, ni tampoco con la excelencia. Referirse a tales diferencias para justificar la exclusión de las mujeres para funciones como el arbitraje no tiene ningún fundamento y es sexista.

Dans ce document, nous soutenons qu'il existe des différences importantes entre les rôles dans le jeu et hors du jeu dans le sport. La pertinence des différences de sexe pose de réelles difficultés philosophiques et éthiques pour le féminisme dans le contexte de la pratique d'un sport. Dans le cas de rôles hors du jeu en général, et de l'arbitrage en particulier, nous pensons que la référence à des différences essentielles entre les hommes et les femmes n'est pas pertinente. L’arbitrage du football élite masculin n'est pas un rôle pour lequel les différences «essentielles» (psychologique et biologique) sont causalement impliquées ni dans la compétence ni dans l'excellence. La référence à ces prétendues différences pour justifier l'exclusion des femmes des rôles tels que l’arbitrage est sans fondement et sexiste.

In diesem Papier soll gezeigt werden, dass es im professionellen Sport, auf der Ebene der Bedeutung von Geschlechterrollen, große Unterschiede zwischen der Funktionärsebene und der Eben der aktiven Sportler gibt. Die Relevanz von Geschlechtsunterschieden im aktiven Sport stellt eine echte philosophische und ethische Herausforderung für feministische Positionen dar. Unter Infragestellung eindeutiger Geschlechtszuschreibungen argumentieren wir, dass die essentielle Differenzierung von Männer- und Frauensport, auf Funktionärsebene nicht haltbar ist. Die Funktionärsebene im Profifussball ist kein Bereich in dem “essentialistische” Geschlechterdifferenzen – psychologischer oder biologischer Art – Aussagen über Kompetenz und Exellenz legitimieren würden. Daher ist der Auschluss von Frauen aus diesem Bereich unhaltbar und sexistisch.

在本文, 我們主張運動中有一種介於參與及非參與角色扮演的重要區分。從女性主義觀點, 性別差異的相關問題在運動參與環境中產生了一個真正的哲學上及倫理學上的困難。一般在非參與的角色情況, 以及特別是在擔任裁判執法的情況下, 我們主張與男女角色扮演實質上的差異是無關的。對頂尖男性足球賽的執法的角色不能因為有所謂的 “實質性” (心理學上與生物學上) 的差異來評論執法者的勝任與卓越能力。用這樣的差異性判準來排除女性擔任執法者是沒有根據的, 且具有性別歧視的味道。

Jennifer Mather Saul (born 19 February 1968) is a philosopher working in philosophy of language and philosophy of feminism. Saul is a professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield and the University of Waterloo. Capleton more fire album.

Biography[edit]

Jennifer Saul holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester and a master's degree and PhD from Princeton University,^[1] where she studied under Scott Soames.

Saul has recently co-written a report for the British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy UK with Helen Beebee titled Women in Philosophy in the UK: A Report.^[2] Saul frequently writes comments on women in philosophy, in a variety of non-academic publications.^[3][4][5][6]

Distinguished Woman Philosopher Award[edit]

In December 2011, Jennifer Saul was awarded the Distinguished Woman Philosopher award in Washington, D.C. by the Society for Women in Philosophy. In response to her Distinguished Woman Philosopher Award Saul said, 'I'm deeply honored and absolutely stunned by this. It’s especially wonderful to be recognized as making a difference in people's lives by doing philosophy. For me, that's the highest honor there could be.'^[7] Saul is co-founder and co-blogger for the Feminists Philosophers ^[8] which is a forum that focuses on gender biases. The forum's Gender Conference Campaign ^[9] aims to highlight the lack of participation and representation of female philosophers at world events.

Research areas[edit]

Saul's primary research is in analytic philosophy of language and feminist philosophy. In her most recent book, Lying, Misleading and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics (Oxford University Press 2012), she argues that the distinction between lying and misleading is theoretically significant and illuminates a variety of issues in philosophy of language concerning semantic content, implicature, and assertion. Moreover, because it is also an ethically meaningful distinction, it demonstrates some ways in which communication and speech are apt for ethical analysis. Saul argues that it is not the case, in general, that lying is ethically worse than misleading. Luvell Anderson, in his review of the book, says that 'Her book is an excellent addition to a growing literature of what might be considered applied philosophy of language.'^[10]

In philosophy of language, Saul is also known for her work on substitution of co-referential terms in simple sentences.^[11] Although it is universally accepted that substitution fails in propositional attitude contexts, Saul argues that substitution can also fail in sentences that have no psychological verbs whatsoever. This raises questions about the semantics of names and dominant accounts of attitude reports. In 2007, Saul published Simple Sentences, Substitution and Intuitions (Oxford University Press) in which she develops her views on these issues with attention to their methodological implications. Jennifer Duke-Yonge says of the book, 'Saul advances the study of simple sentence substitution failure by demonstrating the inadequacy of existing accounts, but perhaps more importantly this book brings into focus crucial questions about the problematic role of semantic intuitions, frequently used without question in philosophy of language. In an area like philosophy of language where intuitions are often the primary kind of data we have available, this focused study of their role and nature is to be welcomed.' ^[12]

In feminist philosophy, Saul is known for her book Feminism: Issues & Arguments, Oxford University Press (2003), an introductory text that explores a variety of feminist views and explores their application to controversies over such topics as pornography, abortion, and veiling. Louise Antony says, 'Saul's accessible and engaging introduction to philosophical issues in feminism will challenge students of all political persuasions. Modelling good philosophical method all the way, Saul draws her readers into some of the most important and interesting controversies of contemporary gender studies.'^[13] She has also done important work on pornography, objectification, and the history of the vibrator.

From 2011-2013, Saul was Director of the Leverhulme-funded Implicit Bias and Philosophy International Research Project. The project brought together nearly 100 researchers in philosophy and psychology to explore the implications of research on implicit bias and related topics for epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral/political philosophy.

Publications[edit]

• Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics (Oxford University Press 2013)
• Substitution, Simple Sentences and Intuitions (Oxford University Press 2007)
• Feminism: Issues & Arguments, Oxford University Press (2003).
• 'Politically Significant Terms and Philosophy of Language: Methodological Issues' Anita Superson and Sharon Crasnow, Analytic Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, Oxford University Press 2012.
• 'Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and Women in Philosophy' forthcoming in Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?, Edited by Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchison, Oxford University Press.
• “Just Go Ahead and Lie”, Analysis, January 2012.
• “Rankings of Quality and Rankings of Reputation: Problems for both from Implicit Bias”, Journal of Social Philosophy 2012.
• “Maker’s Knowledge or Perpetuator’s Ignorance?” Jurisprudence 2012.
• “Conversational Implicature, Speaker Meaning, and Calculability” Klaus Petrus (ed.) Meaning and Analysis: New Essays on H. Paul Grice, Palgrave MacMillan 2010
• “Conversational Implicature, Speaker Meaning, and Calculability”, Klaus Petrus (ed.) Meaning and Analysis: New Essays on H. Paul Grice, Palgrave 2010, 170-183.
• “Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated”, Noûs, Vol.36 No.2, 2002, pp. 228–248.
• 'What is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project And Relevance Theorists' Criticisms', Linguistics & Philosophy, 25, 2002, pp. 347–372.
• 'What are Intensional Transitives?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2002, Supplementary Volume LXXVI, 2002, pp. 101–120.
• (with David Braun) “Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Mistaken Evaluations”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 111, 2002, pp. 1–41.

External links[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^'Profile: Jennifer Saul - Profiles - People - Philosophy - the University of Sheffield'.
2. ^http://swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08/Women%20in%20Philosophy%20in%20the%20UK%20(BPA-SWIPUK%20Report).pdf
3. ^http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=1079
4. ^'Male domination of philosophy 'must end''. 2013-03-07.
5. ^'Women job candidates in philosophy appalled by the 'smoker''.
6. ^Schuessler, Jennifer (2013-08-02). 'A Star Philosopher Falls, and a Debate Over Sexism Is Set Off'. The New York Times.
7. ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 2013-10-21. Retrieved 2013-07-24.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
8. ^'Feminist Philosophers'.
9. ^'Gendered Conference Campaign'. 2009-12-10.
10. ^Anderson, Luvell (July 2013). 'Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics'. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Retrieved 25 June 2014.Cite journal requires journal= (help)
11. ^Saul, Jennifer (1997). 'Substitution and Simple Sentences'. Analysis. 57 (2): 102–108. doi:10.1093/analys/57.2.102.
12. ^Duke-Yonge, Jennifer (2009). 'Simple Sentences, Substitution and Intuitions'. Analysis. 69: 174–176. doi:10.1093/analys/ann025. Retrieved 25 June 2014.
13. ^Feminism: Issues & Arguments. Oxford University Press. 2003-06-12. ISBN9780199249473.